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1959] RECENT DECISIONS 415 
CoRPORATIONs-CoMPENSATION OF MANAGEMENT-BONUS PLANS-Defend-
ant corporation's board of directors adopted a profit-sharing retirement 
plan which was never ratified by the shareholders.1 The plan assigned 
to key employees "units" having a fixed dollar value equal to the current 
market value of the corporation's common stock.2 The company promised 
to pay each unit holder, upon termination of employment, a sum equal 
to the number of units held times the increase in market value of the 
stock from the time the units were issued to the date employment termin-
ated or any date within five years thereafter selected by the employee.8 
1 In 1951, 90% of the shareholders ratified a management proposal to finance the 
plan with a reserve of 200,000 shares of the company's authorized but unissued stock. 
Although the shareholders were notified of its basic features, this was held not to be 
effective ratification of the plan. Principal case at 93-94. 
2 The market value of the common stock at the time of the plan's adoption in 1946 
was $18 per share. In 1951 it ranged from 37¼ to 51. MOODY'S INDUSTRIALS 210 (1952). At 
the end of 1957 it was S95 per share, adjusted for a 3:1 stock split in 1956. The number 
of units received by each employee varied from 400 to 10,000. 
3 A 1951 amendment required an employee electing the second alternative to notify 
the company ten days in advance of the selected date, and a 1956 amendment reduced 
the period in this alternative to two years. 
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The right of each unit-holder to receive the increased value of his units 
vested only after five years of employment. In a derivative action brought 
by plaintiff shareholder to restrain further operation of defendant's plan, 
held, defendant is enjoined from making further agreements under its 
plan.4 Payments to be made under a plan based on increase in market 
value of the employer corporation's common stock bear no reasonable 
relation to the value of the employee's services and thus would constitute 
a wasting of corporate assets. Berkwitz v. Humphrey, (N.D. Ohio 1958) 
163 F. Supp. 78. 
A corporation may validly compensate its executives with corporate 
stock5 or stock options.6 The plan in the instant case gave executives 
all the financial benefits of stock ownership7 in the form of "units" rather 
than stock, but this difference does not alter its substance.8 While the 
plan might produce disparate results between two executives,9 this may 
also be true of stock option plans.10 The decisive question as to validity 
should be whether under the plan benefits which accrue to a particular 
executive are unreasonably greater than the value of his services.11 In 
the instant case it is difficult to ascertain the benefits accruing to a particular 
executive because of the contingent character of his rights under the 
plan.12 This determination could be made by analogizing the plan to a 
4 The court did not invalidate agreements already in existence at the time of suit 
because those unit-holders were not ·before the court. 
Ii WASHINGTON AND ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 98 (1951). 
6 Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 32 Del. Ch. 219, 90 A. (2d) 652 (1951). 
7 In addition to the increase in market value the unit-holders also received annual 
amounts equal to the cash dividends they would have received had they held shares equal 
in number to their units. In case of a stock dividend or a stock split the units were to be 
increased proportionally. The plan did not, however, give the unit-holders such non-
financial benefits as the right to vote at shareholders' meetings, inspect corporate books, 
initiate suit on the corporation's behalf or transfer units without the corporation's 
consent. 
8 The Texas Company has a unit plan much like that involved in the principal case 
except that stock equal to the increased value of his units is issued directly to the unit-
holder at the time his employment terminates. WASHINGTON AND ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSAT-
ING THE CORPORATE EXECUfIVE 99-100 and appendix LL (1951). 
9 Compare the effect on unit-holder A who works five years and retires when the 
market value of defendant's stock is high with the effect on unit-holder B who works 
thirty years and retires when the market value is low. See principal case at 91. 
10 Under the hypothetical facts of note 9 supra, assume that A and B are given stock 
options instead of units and exercised the options at the same time. If A sold his stock 
after five years and B did so after thirty years the same disparity in compensation would 
occur. 
ll Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1932). 
12 There are here two underlying questions to be considered. (1) As of what time 
should the market value of the stock which will determine the amount of compensation 
the executive will ultimately receive finally be determined: the date on which units were 
assigned, the date at which each executive's rights under the plan became vested, the 
date of trial, or some speculative date in the future at which the executive is likely to 
retire? (2) Over what period is any increase in market value to be spread? The intervals 
between the above dates suggest the possibilities as to this question. 
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stock13 or stock option plan.14 In determining the value of an executive's 
services relevant factors are the character of those services, the financial 
success of the corporation,15 its relative size, and amounts paid by cor-
porations of similar size. In the instant case, however, the court eschewed 
the above analysis in favor of an inquiry into the soundness in general 
of market value of stock as a measure of the value of an executive's services. 
The market value of corporate stock depends in part upon factors 
unrelated to the value of an employee's services: the confidence of in-
vestors, the cost of money, the supply of stock available on the market, and 
inflationary or deflationary trends in the economy.16 These factors may 
also affect corporate earnings; yet the courts have readily approved bonus 
plans based on a percentage of corporate earnings.17 Any difference in 
the relation to the value of an employee's services between corporate earn-
ings on the one hand and increase in market value of stock on the other 
is largely one of degree. The extent of the difference depends on the 
current condition of the economy, a question normally left by the courts 
to the discretion of the directors.18 The principle which upholds plans 
permitting executives to share reasonably in corporate earnings could easily 
be extended to uphold a plan permitting executives to share reasonably 
in increases in the market value of corporate stock.19 The principle has in 
fact been so extended in the case of stock option plans which enable car-
13 Under this analogy the date at which the market value of the stock is finally 
determined would normaIIy be the date at which the executive's rights vested. The period 
over which any increase in value is spread would normaIIy be the interval between assign-
ment and vesting. WASHINGTON AND ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 
98 (1951). Defendant Love, for example, received 10,000 units in 1946 when the market 
value of the stock was $18. His rights vested in 1951 when the market value was $51. Thus 
he received a $330,000 benefit for five years work or $66,000 per year. The difficulty with 
this analogy is that the executive cannot "seII" his units as he could stock without quitting 
his job. 
14 Under this analogy the date at which market value is finaIIy determined would 
normaIIy be the date of suit. The period over which any increase in value is spread would 
normally be the interval between assignment and suit. Wyles v. Campbell, (D.C. Del. 1948) 
77 F. Supp. 343 at 349-351. Applying this analogy to the example in note 13 supra, since 
the market value in 1957 was $95, defendant Love received $770,000 for eleven years or 
$70,000 per year. 
15 Defendant corporation was formed by merger of two corporations which were 
in bad financial straits. The new corporation has prospered from the outset and has paid 
dividends annually. For additional background see principal case at 82-83. 
16 Principal case at 90. 
17 5 FLETCHER, CYC. CORP. 557 (1952); STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 756 (1949). But 
in Rogers v. Hill, note II supra, a bonus plan based on earnings which paid the corpora-
tion president $842,507 in 1930 was held unreasonable. 
18 See Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 653 at 680 (1941); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 
200 (1946). 
19 "We have long since passed the stage in which stockholders, who merely invest 
capital and leave it wholly to management to make it fruitful, can make absolutely ex-
clusive claim to profits against those whose labor, skill, ability, judgment, and effort have 
made profits available." Gallin v. National City Bank, 273 N.Y.S. 87 at 113-114, 152 Misc. 
679 (1934), cited in principal case at 90. 
418 M1cHIGAN LAw REVIEW [ Vol. 57 
porate executives to share in the benefits of inflation and to hedge against 
it as well as to share in the corporate prosperity to which their efforts 
have contributed.20 It is surprising that the reasonable-relation-to-services 
test which has been held to permit a wide variety of executive compensa-
tion plans should be applied to enjoin the further operation of a sub-
stantially similar plan. 
Sidney Buchanan 
20 See comment, 47 MrcH. L. REV. 1179 at 1191 (1949). See also Clamitz v. Thatcher 
Mfg. Co., (2d Cir. 1947) 158 F. (2d) 687. 
